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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

JOHNSON v. M’INTOSH AND THE SOUTH DAKOTA FOSSIL CASES

DANA G. JIM*
Every autumn in American law schools, future attorneys begin their
introduction to the study of law by focusing on the four primary concepts of
the American legal system: Contracts, Civil Procedure, Torts, and Property.
Of the many cases these students will read to start their legal journey, the case
of Johnson v. M’Intosh1 is special because it brings up issues of wealth, power
and politics.2 This case gives students a glimpse into America’s past and gives
students and teachers alike the opportunity to analyze the premises that guide
Supreme Court decisions.3
This Essay will not spend much time on the technical holding of the case;
the law professor can do that in class. Instead, this Essay will focus on the
impact of one of Johnson’s principles on several federal cases concerning
“Sue”, a Tyrannosaurus Rex.4 With this discussion, I hope law professors and
academia will recognize that Johnson and the South Dakota Fossil Cases can

* Chairman, National Indian Youth Leadership Project, Gallup, New Mexico; Intern, Indian
Country Lawyers, P.C., Shawnee, Oklahoma; J.D., 1999, School of Law, Oklahoma City
University; B.A., Political Science, 1994, Oklahoma City University; Public Policy and
International Affairs (PPIA) Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1993; Harry S. Truman
Scholar, 1993.
1. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country: The
Double-Edged Sword of the Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising Out of Early
Supreme Court Opinions and the General Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REV. 35, 51 (1995); Steven
Paul McSloy, “Because the Bible Tells Me So”: Manifest Destiny and American Indians, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 39, 42 (1996); Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of Christian Nationalism in
Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 310 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Lindsay G. Robertson, John Marshall as Colonial Historian: Reconsidering
the Origins of the Discovery Doctrine, 13 J.L. & POL. 759, 761 (1997); See also G. EDWARD
WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 708-709 (Abridged Ed.
Oxford 1991) (stating Marshall’s strong beliefs in Republicanism can be observed in the Johnson
case). See also Monette, supra note 2, at 53 n.100.
4. See Black Hills Inst. v. United States, 967 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1992); Black Hills Inst. v.
United States, 978 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1992); Black Hills Inst. v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 1015
(D.S.D. 1993); Black Hills Inst. v. South Dakota Sch. of Mines and Tech., 12 F.3d 737 (8th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 810 (1994); Black Hills Inst. v. Williams, 88 F.3d 614 (8th Cir.
1996).
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serve as a perfect introduction to the study of property.5 The life of the lawyer
is legal application, legal application and legal application. These cases help
the future lawyer learn how to apply the law to the facts.
In Johnson, we learned that Indians have rights of occupancy and use of
the land under the concept of Indian title.6 In addition, the case stood for the
principle that the federal government had the “exclusive right to extinguish”
the Indian title.7 In other words, the federal government must approve the sale
of Indian land. This concept of federal supremacy over the conveyance of
Indian lands was codified in the early years of the federal government through
the Nonintercourse Acts. Enacted in the early 1790s, these laws rendered void
any land sale by Indians if the sale was not made according to “the authority of
the United States,”8 or “treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
constitution . . . .”9
These statutes were only the tip of the iceberg. Today, there are numerous
federal statutes and regulations that govern transactions that occur on Indian
land. For example, federal law mandates that a federal government official,
the Secretary of the Interior, make the final decision to grant the following
leases on Indian land: farming and grazing leases,10 mineral leases11 and oil
and gas leases.12 Another statute is 25 U.S.C. § 483, which governs
conveyances of land. It states the following in part:
§ 483. Sale of land by individual Indian owners
The Secretary of the Interior . . . is authorized in his discretion, and upon
application of the Indian owners, . . . to approve conveyances, with respect to
lands or interests in lands held by individual Indians . . . .13

The reason for citing to these various statutes is to reinforce the most
important concept of Johnson: the Sovereign controls Indian land
conveyances.14 There is no better example of illustrating the way this principle

5. Throughout the year, Johnson can be used by the professor to begin discussion of
various topics in property law. This helps students to learn legal application. Here are a few
examples. Since the interested party in the Johnson case is Johnson and Graham’s lessee, what
are the rights and duties of a lessee? Later in the year, the professor could describe the chain of
title to the land at issue in Johnson in order to begin a discussion of the recording system.
6. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
7. See id. at 586.
8. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137 at 138 (1790) (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§ 177 (1994)).
9. Act of March 1, 1793, ch 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329 at 330 (1793) (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§177 (1994)).
10. 25 U.S.C. § 393 (1994).
11. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1994).
12. 25 U.S.C. §396e (1994).
13. 25 U.S.C. §483 (1994) (emphasis added).
14. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586 (1823).
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of the Johnson case has been applied to the present day than by the story of
“Sue,” the Tyrannosaurus Rex fossil found in South Dakota in the early
1990s.15
I. THE SOUTH DAKOTA FOSSIL CASES
In the hot South Dakota summer of 1990, Sue Hendrickson made a
discovery that would change history. It took all of ten minutes.16
As an employee for a non-profit company named the Black Hills Institute
of Geological Research, Inc., Ms. Hendrickson decided to stay behind at a
dinosaur excavation after others left the area due to mechanical problems.17
She spent this time “poking through the edges of a cliff.”18 Ten minutes later,
she came across the most complete Tyrannosaurus Rex fossil ever found.19
But while this fossil was seen as a paleontologist’s dream, it quickly became a
legal nightmare to those who found it.
First, the location of the bones became as important as the discovery itself.
The bones happened to be found on land held in “trust” by the United States
for Mr. Maurice Williams, a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.20
What is trust land, and why should it matter to the lawyer in this case? Recall
in Johnson the discussion of conquest as a means of acquiring title to Indian
land.21 After a spirited defense of conquest, Chief Justice Marshall states the
need of the Indians “to be protected” while “in the possession of their lands.”22
That the Indians need “to be protected” became a major theme in the late
1800s.23 During this time the federal government allocated tribal land to
individual Indians.24
15. For a discussion of “Sue” in the legal literature, see Patrick K. Duffy and Lois A.
Lofgren, Jurassic Farce: A Critical Analysis of the Government’s Seizure of “SueTM,” A SixtyFive Million-Year-Old Tyrannosaurus Rex Fossil, 39 S.D. L. REV. 478, 527-28 (1994) (noting
that “the government’s original justification for the seizure had no basis in law,” as well as other
criticisms including a conclusion that the appellate court “used a strained analogy to timber
resources in order to characterize SueTM as land.”); see also Allison M. Dussias, Science,
Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights, 55
MD. L. REV. 84, 87 (1996) (reciting the discovery of “Sue,” and focusing on the “role tribes
should play in the regulation of paleontological resources found on tribal lands.” This article also
notes several other law review articles focusing on “Sue.”); see also WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 361 (mentioning “Sue” in a discussion of Indian
allotments).
16. Tara McAndrew, The Story of Sue, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, Ill.), July 3,
1998, (Magazine), at 5A, available at 1998 WL 11283387.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Black Hills Inst. v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (D.S.D. 1993).
21. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823).
22. See id. at 591.
23. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 132 (Rennard Strickland et
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Under this system of tenure, the title to these allotment parcels would not
be held by the Indian possessor. Instead, it would be held by the federal
government in “trust” for him.25 In other words, the United States holds the
title to the land, but the Indian receives the land’s benefits.26 Today, there are
10 million acres of land held in trust by the federal government for individual
Indians.27
Second, the transaction that followed became critical to the case. After the
discovery of these bones, the Institute paid Mr. Williams $5,000 for title to the
fossil.28 To the layman, this would seem like a simple transaction between the
Institute and Mr. Williams. Under the circumstances, however, the savvy
lawyer should have asked if the federal government needed to be involved in
that transaction.29 Once it acquired title, the Institute worked for seventeen
days to excavate the 65 million year old fossil, which had been nicknamed
“Sue” for Ms. Hendrickson.30 After transporting “Sue” to the Institute’s
research center and spending over $200,000 to restore the fossil,31 the
Institute’s efforts were interrupted by an early morning raid on May 14, 1992,
by FBI agents, U.S. Park Rangers and members of the South Dakota National
Guard.32 These officers placed “Sue” in a machine shop at the South Dakota
School of Mines and Technology for safekeeping.33
The United States Attorney for South Dakota sent these officers on
allegations that the Institute had violated the Federal Antiquities Act.34
Believing “Sue” would be damaged at the school,35 the Institute sued the
federal government in the United States District Court for the District of South

al. eds., 1982) (stating that a “philanthropic aim of allotment was protection of individual Indian’s
land”).
24. See id. at 616.
25. See id. at 131, 616.
26. See CANBY, supra note 15 at 234 (stating “[T]he legal title to existing allotments is held
by the United States, with the entire beneficial interest being in the individual allotees.”).
27. See JACK UTTER, AMERICAN INDIANS: ANSWERS TO TODAY’S QUESTIONS 217 (2d ed.
Univ. of Okla. 2001).
28. Black Hills Inst. v. Williams, 88 F.3d 614, 615 (8th Cir. 1996).
29. See id. at 616 (citing Black Hills Inst. v. South Dakota Sch. Of Mines and Tech., 12 F.3d
737, 744 (8th Cir. 1993), which stated the “Institute could have taken any number of steps to
protect itself” and that since the fossil was “embedded” in the land the Institute should have
noticed “the possibility that the federal government had some interest in the [fossil]”).
30. Black Hills Inst. v. United States, 967 F.2d 1237, 1238, 1238 n.2, 1239 (8th Cir. 1992).
31. Black Hills Inst. v. South Dakota Sch. Of Mines and Tech., 12 F.3d 737, 739 (8th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 810 (1994); Black Hills Inst., 88 F.3d at 615.
32. Black Hills Inst., 967 F.2d at 1239.
33. Id.
34. 16 U.S.C. §433 (1994); see Black Hills Inst., 967 F.2d at 1238.
35. See id.
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Dakota to have the bones returned to them. The court ruled against the
Institute stating the bones were lawfully seized.36
Here is where the process of legal application in this case begins. The
Institute tried another strategy to get “Sue” back. This time the Institute asked
the court for the return of personal property.37 Recognizing that ownership is
the heart of property, the court focused on ownership of the fossil—to the
court, personal property implicated the issue of ownership.38 Accordingly, the
court stated that a “permanent possessory right to the fossil is subsumed within
the context of ownership. It is axiomatic that one cannot assert permanent
possession as against the rightful owner absent a contract or agreement
providing otherwise.”39 This gave the court the opportunity to decide an issue
that it earlier had not examined: the issue of “ownership of these bones.”40
After noting several decisions that illustrated the federal government’s role
in the maintenance and supervision of Indian lands,41 the court looked to a
specific law, 25 U.S.C. §483, which is noted above.42 The district court
focused on the phrase “interest in land”43 and made the startling conclusion
that “Sue” was an interest in land; therefore, the sale of “Sue” was subject to
approval by the Secretary of the Interior.44 How did the court conclude this?
The court arrived at this decision by applying South Dakota laws that defined
property.45 According to South Dakota law, real property is made up of
“land,” which consists of “the solid material of earth, whatever may be the
ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil, rock, or other substance.”46
This meant that “Sue,” a fossil, which is a “substance”, could be defined as
“land” since it “composes” part of the earth in South Dakota.47
By analyzing this phrase, the district court traced back, without realizing it,
to the primary principle of Johnson: federal government exclusivity regarding
conveyances of Indian land.48 This is how pervasive the Johnson principle is

36. See id.
37. Black Hills Inst. v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 1015, 1018 (D.S.D. 1993) (emphasis
added).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Black Hills Inst., 967 F.2d at 1238.
41. Black Hills Inst., 812 F.Supp. at 1019.
42. Id. at 1020; see supra text accompanying note 9.
43. See Black Hills Inst., 812 F.Supp. at 1020, 1021.
44. Id. at 1021 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 483 (1994); 25 C.F.R. §§ 152.22-152.23).
45. See id. (quoting S.D. Codified Laws §§ 43-1-1 to 43-1-4 (Michie 1997).
46. Id. (quoting S.D. Codified Laws §§ 43-1-3, 43-1-4 (Michie 1997)) (emphasis added).
47. Please note that the district court held that “Sue” was an “interest in land.” See Black
Hills Inst., 812 F.2d 1015, 1021. However, the appellate court later ruled that “Sue” was simply
“land.” See Black Hills Inst., 12 F.3d 737, 742. This does not make a difference for legal
application purposes since both terms are treated the same in 25 U.S.C. §483.
48. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586 (1823).
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today. The court glanced back to the facts, noting that Maurice Williams had
not applied to the Secretary of the Interior to “secure approval for sale of any
interest in land to the [Institute].”49 Recall that the Institute paid Mr. Williams
$5,000 for title to the fossil.50 Because Mr. Williams did not get prior approval
for sale of the title, however, “the [Institute] acquired no right to either
ownership or possession of the fossil.”51 In the words of the court, the sale was
“null and void.”52 Thus, the Institute did not own “Sue.” But who did? More
importantly, who would benefit from “Sue?”
Before finishing this legal journey, it is important to note the legal
application that has occurred. Note that both the district court and appellate
court have applied a statute, 25 U.S.C. §483, to the facts. For 25 U.S.C. §483
to apply, the courts had to answer two questions. First, was “Sue”
“land”/”interest in land?” Second, if “Sue” was “land”/”interest in land,” did
Maurice Williams apply to the Secretary of the Interior for approval of the sale
of Sue to the Black Hills Institute of Geological Research? The appellate court
answers these two questions in a way the district court did not. The following
excerpt from the appellate decision is worth reading since it demonstrates a
well-structured application of law to fact.
We hold that the fossil was “land” within the meaning of . . . §483. Sue
Hendrickson found the fossil embedded in the land. Under South Dakota law,
the fossil was in “ingredient” comprising part of the “solid material of the
earth.” It was a component part of Williams’ land, just like the soil, the rocks,
and whatever other naturally occurring materials make up the earth of the
ranch. . . . The salient point is that the fossil had for millions of years been an
“ingredient” of the earth that the United States holds in trust for Williams. . . .
Here, however, a Tyrannosaurus rex died some 65 million years ago on what is
now Indian trust land and its fossilized remains gradually became incorporated
into that land. Although it is movable, the fossil it was part of Williams’ land
and thus subject to . . . §483. . . . Because he did not seek the Secretary’s
approval, we hold that Williams’ attempted sale to Black Hills is void and that
the United States hold Sue in trust for Williams pursuant to the trust patent.53

The Institute appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit which not only affirmed the district court’s decision that
the Institute did not own “Sue,”54 but also narrowed the district court’s holding

49. Black Hills Inst., 812 F.Supp. at 1020.
50. See supra text accompanying note 25.
51. Black Hills Inst., 812 F.Supp. at 1021.
52. See id. at 1020.
53. Black Hills Inst., 12 F.3d 737, 742-743 (applying S.D. Codified Laws §§ 43-1-2, 43-1-4
(Michie 1997)) (footnotes omitted).
54. Black Hills Inst. v. South Dakota Sch. of Mines and Tech., 12 F.3d 737, 745 (8th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 810 (1994).
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that “Sue” was “land,”55 and that the United States held “Sue” in “trust” for
Mr. Williams.56 Not pleased with this ruling, the Institute appealed the
decision to the United States Supreme Court which denied certiorari on
October 3, 1994.57 “Sue’s” four year journey of ownership had ended.
In the end, the Institute had nothing to show for its work but the pain it
suffered from losing court battle after court battle.58 In fact, the owner of the
Institute, Peter Larson, served an eighteen month prison term for charges
surrounding the excavation of “Sue.”59 As for “Sue,” she made a public
appearance at Sotheby’s auction house in October of 1997.60 In a few minutes,
she was sold to Chicago’s Field Museum of Natural History Field for $8.36
million.61 Interestingly, a group comprising the Field Museum of Chicago,
McDonald’s Corporation and the Walt Disney Company financed the winning
bid.62
After the auction, the public could watch paleontologists prepare the
massive Tyrannosaurus Rex at McDonald’s Fossil Preparation Laboratory in
Chicago and Disney’s Dinoland U.S.A. Laboratory in Orlando, Florida.63 In
those facilities, people prepared “Sue” for a formal unveiling to mark the year
2000.64 As for Maurice Williams, the beneficiary of the trust property where
“Sue” was found, he became a wealthy beneficiary of the Johnson rule when
he received the $8.36 million at Sotheby’s.65 Remember, the federal
government holds mere title to the “land,” but the Indian receives the
benefits.66 Federal officials felt that the auction process was the “best way to
get a fair price” for him.67 After all, it was his “land.” Giving a man a fair
price for his “land” is something the “Courts of the conqueror” cannot deny.68

55. See id. at 742.
56. See id. at 742-743.
57. Black Hills Inst. v. South Dakota Sch. of Mines and Tech., 513 U.S. 810 (1994).
58. In Black Hills Institute v. Williams, 88 F.3d 614, 615 (8th Cir. 1996), the court ruled
against the Institute in their last lawsuit, in which they were asking to impose a $209,000 lien
against Maurice Williams, owner of the property where Sue was “discovered,” for the work the
Institute did to restore the fossil.
59. See McAndrew, supra note 14, at 5A.
60. Stevenson Swanson, Buying T-Rex A Really Big Deal, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Oct. 12, 1997, at A1, available at 1997 WL 12671506.
61. See id.
62. See McAndrew, supra note 14, at 5A.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Swanson, supra note 55, at A1.
66. See CANBY, supra note 23, at 361.
67. See id.
68. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823) (discussing the title that
results from conquest).
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For the student, there is an important point to keep in mind. The district
court case ended with a rebuke to the Institute for not being knowledgeable of
the status of Mr. Williams’ land. The court declared that if the Institute had
taken notice of 25 U.S.C. §483, made an application and waited and received
Secretarial approval for the sale of the bones to the Institute, “all the months of
contention could have been avoided.”69 Actually, the Institute’s lawyers did
not have to be aware of §483’s statutory language to avoid the legal mess.
Instead, the lawyers should have recalled the principle of Johnson: the
Sovereign controls Indian land conveyances.70
II. CONCLUSION
This Essay can be used by those in academia to aide their students, or
perhaps vice-versa, in learning to get beyond the textbook, and to look at “new
strategies to practice law . . . .”71 The aim of this Essay is to show the
lingering effects of the Johnson case in America. The principles Chief Justice
Marshall affirmed more than a century and a half ago still live in the
regulations that face Indians and those who deal with them everyday. The
story of the “Sue” conveyance illustrates that the issues presented in Johnson
do not die. Again, Johnson v. M’Intosh is a case that many law students read
for their first day of law school. Law professors can use the South Dakota
Fossil Cases to illustrate many of the concepts discussed in Johnson v.
M’Intosh.

69. See Black Hills Inst. v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 1015, 1022 (D.S.D. 1993).
70. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 586.
71. See Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REV.
239, 244 n.38 (1991).

